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Goldman [Sachs] should matter to outsiders . . . because it stands at 
the centre of a two-decade-long transformation of the financial 
markets and a new approach to risk.  Business risks that were once 
seen as a lumpy fact of life are now routinely sliced up and packaged 
into combinations that generally suit issuers and investors alike.  At 
the heart of this change has been the development of huge markets in 
swaps, derivatives and other complex and often opaque instruments 
that allow the transfer of risk from one party to another.  From small 
beginnings in 1987, the face value of contracts in interest-rate and 
currency derivatives is now more than $200 trillion[,] 16 times 
America’s GDP.  A further $17 trillion is outstanding in (even 
newer) credit-default swaps, which allow bond investors to lay off 
the risk of issuers defaulting.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Heralded as the “debutante of the suretyship world (pure as the 
wind-driven snow and virtually unsullied by the foul touch of 
litigation),” credit default swaps (CDS) have transformed banking.2  
Lenders who once found themselves stuck with bundles of indivisible, 
illiquid risks can now carve out and hedge credit exposure to individual 
borrowers.  And they do it on a massive scale.  As last reported by 
FitchRatings, the notional amount of outstanding CDS stood at $3.5 
trillion, representing two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market 
and an 86% increase from the prior year’s total of $2.8 trillion.3  Yet 
despite such rapid growth, use of credit derivatives was too small to be 
either noticed or recorded at any significant levels in 1996.4
 1. On Top of the World: In Its Taste for Risk, the World’s Leading Investment 
Bank Epitomises the Modern Financial System, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2006, at 11. 
 2. Robert D. Aicher et al., Credit Enhancement: Letters of Credit, Guaranties, 
Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of Cultures), 59 BUS. LAW. 897, 898 (2004).  For lack 
of a more elegant formulation, “CDS” will be used (1) as a noun to refer to “credit 
default swap” (singular) and “credit default swaps” (plural), and (2) as an adjective to 
refer to the markets, contracts and other entities that are related to credit default swaps. 
 3. FitchRatings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: Single-Name CDS Fuel 
Growth (2004), available at http://www.fitchratings.com (requires login) (hereinafter 
FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2004); FitchRatings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: Risk 
Dispersion Accelerates (2005), available at http://www.fitchratings.com (requires 
login) (hereinafter FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2005). 
 4. Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bank Derivatives Report: Third Quarter 
2005 (2005), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/deriv/deriv.htm (hereinafter OCC 
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As one would expect of a market that has gone from cradle to world 
phenomenon in less than a decade, CDS have attracted both supporters 
and detractors.  Proponents extol the ability of CDS to spread risk and 
increase liquidity across credit markets, allowing participants to actively 
manage and protect credit portfolios.5  Sensational critics warn that a 
spike in interest rates could trigger a “derivatives tsunami” that would 
bring all of the major banks to their knees and cause a “blowup” in 
world credit markets.6  Experience in the past few years has shown that, 
if used responsibly, CDS have the ability to yield all of the promised 
benefits with few—if any—of the predicted catastrophes.7  Between the 
REPORT 3Q 2005). 
 5. See, e.g., FitchRatings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: A Qualified 
Success (2003), available at http://www.fitchratings.com (requires login) (hereinafter 
FITCH RATINGS REPORT 2003); JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER 
DERIVATIVES 507 (6th ed. 2005). 
 6. Mara Der Hovanesian et al., Taking Risk to the Extreme: Will Derivatives 
Cause a Major Blowup in the World’s Credit Markets?, BUSINESS WEEK, May 23, 
2005, at 96.  It is worth noting that many of the apocalyptic articles about CDS came 
following the downgrading of GM debt in April 2005.  Responding to the doom-and-
gloom contingent, Global Finance reported in September 2005 that the CDS market 
was far more efficient at absorbing large financial shocks than anyone could have 
expected: 
There had been concerns that growth in credit derivatives volume, much of which 
comes from credit default swaps, could be stalled by concerns about involvement in 
the market following the downgrade of Ford and General Motors in April and the 
resultant problems in the credit market.  However, the credit derivatives market 
appears to have been strengthened by the experience, and new entrants—largely 
pension funds and other institutional investors—have kept their nerve as the market 
has recovered. 
Laurence Neville, Credit Derivatives Market Primed to Explode, GLOBAL FINANCE 
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2006, at 8. 
 7. See, e.g., Fitch Ratings Report 2003, supra note 5, at 4-5; Fitch Ratings 
Report 2005, supra note 3; Neville, Credit Derivatives Market Primed to Explode, 
supra note 5, at 8.  Early in 2006, the Financial Times reported the incident of a twenty-
six-year-old CDS trader at Deutsche Bank in London, who had misstated his position 
by £30 million ($53 million).  Paul J. Davies, Deutsche Trader Was “High-Flyer,” FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006.  While noting that gross trader slipups and cover-ups naturally 
raise the specter of the Barings collapse, the Financial Times rightly concluded that 
such incidents simply show that managers must “get to grips with the complexities of 
the new markets.  The age-old adage about investing only in what you understand still 
works.  There is no substitute for . . . understanding the products on which [derivatives] 
are based, [their] potential volatility and how the instruments should be valued.”  Back 
to Basics for Derivatives Traders: There Is No Substitute for Fundamental Analysis in 
Credit Markets, FIN. TIMES Jan. 12, 2006, at 18. 
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disparagers and the defenders of CDS stand the regulators.  But who are 
the regulators of CDS markets, and what law applies? 
Since CDS are traded entirely over-the-counter (OTC), one could 
argue that the true regulators are market participants themselves.  
Banded together as members of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created a 
system of documenting and amending trade relationships that is both 
flexible and robust.  Most members of ISDA are banks or groups of 
banks.  Some outside regulators, however, worry that CDS markets are 
growing too quickly for any bank or group of banks to control.8
In judging who has authority to step in and govern various aspects 
of CDS trading, one confronts a crowd of would-be regulators.  The 
CFTC, SEC, Fed, state insurance regulators, and both state and federal 
courts all have spheres of competence that, depending on circumstances, 
may or may not affect CDS trading.  Letters of guarantee and other 
analogous surety instruments require their users to focus on merely one 
body of statutory law—e.g., Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code—and its applicable case precedents; CDS, on the other hand, 
demand that their users at least take account of (and perhaps apply) 
commodities, securities, banking, and insurance regulation, as well as all 
applicable case law. 
Where commodities regulation is concerned, CDS enjoy a blanket 
exemption under the Commodities Exchange Act.9  The Commodities 
Exchange Act (the “Act”) includes in its definition of “excluded 
commodity” any “credit risk or measure.”10  Building on this definition 
in a section on “excluded derivative transactions,” the Act notes that its 
terms do not apply to any agreement in an excluded commodity where 
such agreements are executed between eligible participants—financial 
institutions, regulated insurance companies, and most investment 
companies—off of a registered exchange.11  Similar provisions apply to 
“excluded swap transactions.”12  The combined effect of these 
provisions provides complete exemption from CFTC supervision for the 
 8. See, e.g., Hamish Risk, Credit Derivatives Market Expands to $17.3 Trillion 
(2006) available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=a9mg 
9712QnRU&refer=us. 
 9. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2000). 
 10. Id. at § 1a(13). 
 11. Id. at § 2(d). 
 12. Id. at § 2(g). 
172 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF [Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
users of CDS.13
Although the regulatory landscape is somewhat more complicated 
in the securities context, the result is the same: general exemption.  Both 
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 exclude from the purview of 
regulated securities all security-based and non-security-based swap 
agreements, as defined in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.14  Under the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, if a CDS relates only to loan and other debt 
obligations—which is often the case—then it qualifies as a “non-
security-based swap agreement.”15  Further, as long as CDS are drafted 
to avoid (1) being characterized as contingent options on debt securities 
and (2) physical delivery of securities, then they will fall under the 
exemption for security-based swap agreements.16  Thus, the securities 
regulations collectively work to exempt CDS from SEC registration and 
reporting requirements.17
In banking regulation, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency has declared generally: “National banks may enter into credit 
derivative transactions.  A national bank may use debt securities that are 
not investment grade debt securities or the credit equivalents thereof, to 
hedge bank permissible derivative, including credit derivative, 
transactions.”18  On a day-to-day level, the Federal Reserve monitors 
banks’ CDS trading activities to ensure that traders are properly 
documenting transactions and that other applicable best practices are 
being observed.19  Although crucial as referees in daily trading, Federal 
 13. Although CDS are OTC products, the Financial Times has reported Eurex and 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange are currently competing to be the first exchange to 
introduce a credit derivatives futures product.  Doug Cameron, Eurex Targets Credit 
Derivatives Market, FIN TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006.  Such products, which would be linked 
to credit derivatives indexes, could possibly trigger a reevaluation, or at least a greater 
clarification, of the place of credit derivatives as they relate to the Commodities 
Exchange Act.  Whatever the outcome of such reevaluation, the exempt status of OTC 
CDS as financial instruments would surely go unmodified. 
 14. Securities Act of 1933 § 2A(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2000); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 §3A(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2000). 
 15. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206C, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2000). 
 16. Id. §§ 206A(a)(3), (b)(1)-(4), 206B. 
 17. Despite this general exemption, the prohibitions on fraud, insider trading and 
manipulation under the Securities and Securities Exchange acts still apply.  See 
Securities Act of 1933, supra note 14, §17(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra 
note 14, §§9(a), 10(b), 15(c)(1), 16(a), 16(b), 20(d). 
 18. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE 
FOR A NATIONAL BANK 38 (2005). 
 19. See, e.g., Risk, supra note 8.  Commenting on the Fed’s efforts to monitor 
2007] RISK DISTRIBUTION IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 173 
 
Banking Regulators and their work do not stand to fundamentally 
regulate the substance of CDS trading going into the future. 
As for judicial regulation, the claim that CDS are “virtually 
unsullied by the foul touch of litigation” bears out in practice.  In its 
2005 CDS survey, FitchRatings reported that in 2004 only 8% of credit 
events involved any form of dispute, down from 14% in 2003.20  Of the 
credit events that involved disputes, “the vast majority . . . have been 
settled or are being resolved without litigation.”21  And for good reason.  
ISDA and its members have a vested interest in shaping the definitions 
used under the ISDA Master Agreement.  The biggest cases involving 
CDS have involved questions as to how to interpret terms related to 
sovereign restructuring under the Master Agreement.22  Mitu Gulati and 
Stephen Choi relate that in the most prominent of these recent cases, 
ISDA moved to revise its definitions, create sovereign debt analysis 
subcommittees, and respond to lawyer recommendations before the ink 
had even dried on the opinion.23  Although their full effect is yet to be 
seen, ISDA’s most recent 2003 Credit Definitions will likely serve to 
further reduce the incidence of CDS disputes—keeping the market “pure 
as the wind-driven snow.” 
While CDS regulation has crystallized in SEC, CFTC, Fed, court 
and ISDA-dictated law since trading took off in the late 1990s, the state 
of insurance regulation remains unsettled in many places.  At bottom, 
the issue for state insurance regulators is whether credit default swaps, 
as instruments that distribute risk for a fee, should qualify as capital 
markets products that escape regulation under state law.  To many 
market observers, the answer is a resounding yes. 
New York updated its insurance laws to exclude CDS in 2004 
(making explicit mention of ISDA’s Credit Derivatives Definitions), but 
many states have followed suit.24  Introducing more confusion, the 
CDS trading, Bloomberg reports: “The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has 
demanded action to tackle a backlog of contracts left unsigned for months on concern 
the undocumented transactions threaten the stability of the financial system.” Id. 
 20. FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2005, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
 21. Id. at 10. 
 22. See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375 
F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004); Aon Fin. Prod. v. Societe Generale, No. 00 Civ. 5863GBD, 
2005 WL 427535 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 23. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1129, 1144 (2006). 
 24. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j-1) (2005); 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 605 (S. 6679-A) 
(approved and effective Oct. 19, 2004).  Colorado’s insurance statute, to cite one 
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners has issued guidelines, 
and defined insurance in such a way that CDS clearly qualify as 
insurance contracts.  Responding to the uncertainty, practitioners and 
ISDA have pointed to the “insurable interest” and “indemnification” 
requirements of most state insurance regimes to say that CDS are capital 
markets products that should not be subject to regulation under state law.  
While these two concepts wield notable power in the argument over 
whether CDS are insurance, they do not wholly explain why and how 
the two regimes differ from one another.  Absent a comprehensive 
theory to demonstrate how and why credit default swaps are capital 
market products that transcend state insurance regulation, state 
regulators will legislate in light of guidance that suggests otherwise. 
The aim of this article is to develop an explanatory theory of why 
CDS are not insurance.  Section II gives a brief overview of the function 
and use of CDS and ISDA in today’s derivatives markets.  Building 
from this account, Section III will first review the development of 
insurance laws as they pertain to CDS in the State of New York, then 
explain and evaluate the approach of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners to derivatives whose function centers around 
fee-based risk distribution.  Finally, Section III develops a 
comprehensive comparison of CDS and insurance at both the contractual 
level and a wider market level.  Having stated a theory of how CDS 
differ from insurance, this paper will set forth conclusions. 
II. THE FUNCTION AND USE OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
A. Using Credit Default Swaps to Hedge Credit Risk 
As banks enter into lending and other debt arrangements, they 
receive bundles of different risks.  Among the possible risks that can 
arise in lending arrangements are: interest-rate/market risk (possibility 
that market interest rates will unexpectedly shift during the term of the 
agreement), liquidity risk (inability to buy or sell an instrument without 
 
example, states: “‘Insurance’ means a contract whereby one, for consideration, 
undertakes to indemnify another or to pay a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit 
upon determinable risk contingencies, and includes annuities.”  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-1-
102(7) (2004).  CDS could easily fit this vague statutory outline.  For more examples of 
state insurance statutes, see NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, DEFINITION OF INSURANCE 
WORKING GROUP WHITE PAPER 2-4 (2000) (hereinafter NAIC DEFINITION OF 
INSURANCE WHITE PAPER). 
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adversely affecting price), and credit risk (risk that the note issuer will 
default).25  Although banks receive market-driven compensation for 
assuming such risks, they might—depending on the diversity of their 
portfolios—desire to keep liquidity and interest rate risks, but trade 
credit risk.  They also might wish to diminish their Basle-dictated capital 
reserve requirements by unloading some of the risks on their balance 
sheets.  CDS facilitate this type of risk trading.26
The following example illustrates how a CDS agreement might be 
structured.27  Borrower writes a $50 million note to Bank.  Desiring to 
reduce its exposure to Borrower, Bank finds a credit protection seller 
and enters into a three-year CDS as the credit protection buyer with the 
notional amount of the contract set equal to the note’s face value.  The 
bank/protection buyer commits to annually pay a small percentage of the 
notional amount (spread) to the protection seller either until the maturity 
of the CDS or until a specified event of default (credit event) occurs.  
The protection seller’s obligation can be defined in one of two ways.  
Upon occurrence of a credit event, a CDS contract can obligate the 
protection seller to either (1) physically settle the CDS by taking 
delivery of the defaulted note in exchange for its face value, or (2) cash 
settle the note.  Where a CDS is cash settled, the parties can designate an 
independent agent to poll other market participants to decide what the 
recovery value of the note would be, and the protection seller must then 
pay the protection buyer the difference between the notional amount and 
the recovery value.28
This simple arrangement raises two important issues, the first 
relating to a definition of a credit event and a second concerning the 
protection buyer’s loss.  First, the parties define the credit event in 
relation to a “reference entity,” which may or may not be the party that 
 25. See, e.g., ANTULIO N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND 
RELATED INSTRUMENTS 3-5 (2005). 
 26. For more on the Basle accords and their relation to capital adequacy 
requirements under U.S. law, see Heath Price Tarbert, Are International Capital 
Adequacy Rules Adequate?  The Basle Accord and Beyond, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1771 
(2000); Barbara C. Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting, and Derivatives, 2 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 167 (1995); Heath Price Tarbert, Rethinking Capital Adequacy: The Basle 
Accord and the New Framework, 56 BUS. LAW. 767 (2001). 
 27. See, e.g., BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 68-69; HULL, supra note 5, at 507-09. 
 28. See, e.g., BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 69; HULL, supra note 5, at 508.  Antulio 
Bomfim notes that, “Cash settlement is more common in Europe than in the United 
States, where, by far, the majority of CDS are physically settled.”  BOMFIM, supra note 
25, at 69. 
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exposes the protection buyer to credit risk.  If the protection buyer is 
exposed to the credit risk of a corporation, then the credit event can 
often be defined in terms of the corporation’s bankruptcy, failure to pay, 
restructuring of debt, acceleration, or downgrading by a credit-rating 
agency (see fig. 1).  Complications can arise, however, when the credit 
risk to be hedged flows from sovereign debt, cash or synthetic CDOs,29 
or an SPV.  For example, sovereigns and trusts do not declare 
bankruptcy like corporations do; they are likely to have different or 
more complicated debt structures, and changes in their credit standing 
may not be as easy to discern.  As a result, the parties to a CDS can 
designate a wholly different reference entity—portfolio of sovereign 
bonds, a bond futures index, etc.—that better suits their purposes (see 
fig. 2).  Figures 1 and 2 show stylized examples of both types of CDS 
transactions. 
The second related issue to note in this context is that the protection 
buyer need not evidence actual loss to claim under a credit default swap.  
The sole trigger for the protection seller’s performance is the credit 
event.  Another way of expressing the same observation is to point out 
that the protection-buyer does not even need to own the reference 
obligation to claim under a CDS.30
The CDS market has become so thick for top reference entities—
which include both corporations such as Ford and Fannie Mae and 
sovereigns such as Brazil and France—that market makers have arisen 
who continually quote both bid spreads (as protection buyers) and ask 
spreads (as protection-sellers).  Indices in both North America (Dow 
Jones CDX) and Europe (iTraxx) track credit default spreads for the top 
125 investment-grade companies on each continent.31  The price 
discovery provided by such indices facilitates the quick and easy sale of 
CDS portfolios, making the CDS market much more liquid than it would 
otherwise be. 
 
 
 
 
 29. For an explanation of CDOs and their relation to CDS, see BOMFIM, supra 
note 25, at 133-43; HULL, supra note 5, at 516-18. 
 30. See, e.g., David Z. Nirenberg & Richard J. Hoffman, Are Credit Default 
Swaps Insurance? 3 DERIVATIVES REP. 7 (Dec. 2001). 
 31. See HULL, supra note 5, at 510; FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2005, supra note 3, at 
9. 
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FIGURE 1 
STRAIGHTFORWARD CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
VARIATION CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP 
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B. Function of ISDA and the ISDA Master Agreement 
The organizations that deal in privately negotiated, OTC derivatives 
belong to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).  
ISDA currently numbers over 670 member institutions in over fifty 
countries.32  Chartered in 1985, ISDA emerged as an organization whose 
mission was to create and promote standardized documentation for 
derivatives at a time when even simple derivatives transactions had high 
transaction costs.33  The first widely used ISDA documentation was the 
1987 Master Agreement, with subsequent versions released in 1992 and 
2002.34  The Master Agreements set forth standardized, market-driven 
terms regulating general obligations of the parties, events of default, 
netting, early termination, transfer, currency provisions, and 
definitions.35  If parties desire to modify any default provisions in the 
Master Agreement for their transaction, they may do so in an amending 
document called a “Schedule.”36  The Master Agreement and Schedule, 
in turn, are given effect in “confirmations,” which are documents that 
serve as evidence of individual transactions under a Master 
Agreement.37  A typical confirmation in a CDS trade sets forth all 
 
 32. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Prevost, Chair, ISDA North America Tax 
Committee, and Robert Pickel, Executive Director, ISDA, to the Internal Rev. Serv. 2 
(Mar. 7, 2006), available at http://www.isda.org/; cf. Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a 
Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 228 (2001).  Flanagan relates: 
[ISDA’s] Primary Membership is composed of dealers and encompasses banks, 
securities companies, and large corporations from over thirty countries, including 
institutions such as Barclays; Chase Manhattan Bank; Credit Suisse First Boston 
International; Deutsche Bank AG; Enron Corporation; Sumitomo Bank Capital 
Markets, Inc.; and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.  The Associate Membership includes 
diverse professional firms and corporations such as Allen & Overy; the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange; Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Euroclear; KPMG Peat Marwick, 
L.L.P.; Standard & Poor’s; and QT Software AG. Id. 
 33. See About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwa_nav.html (last visited Mar. 
23, 2006); cf. Flanagan, supra note 32, at 227–38. 
 34. See ISDA Opinions and Documentation, http://www.isda.org/docproj/ 
ncdproj.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
 35. See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT (2002) 
[hereinafter ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT]; INT’L SWAP DEALERS ASS’N, ISDA MASTER 
AGREEMENT (1992). 
 36. See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO THE 2002 
MASTER AGREEMENT (2002); INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO 
THE MASTER AGREEMENT (1992). 
 37. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
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material terms, including reference entity, payment structure, credit 
events, settlement terms, and term of the agreement.38
One of the key benefits of using the ISDA Master Agreement is that, 
once in place between two parties, all transactions entered into under 
the Master Agreement constitute a single agreement.39  An end-user 
corporation and a swap dealer may exchange large numbers of 
confirmations over the course of several years, resulting in hundreds 
of simultaneous swaps between the parties.  Without a master 
agreement, these swaps would require that the two parties exchange 
hundreds of payments at each swap payment date.  The terms of the 
ISDA Master Agreement, however, can provide for netting the 
payments among all transactions made under the agreement between 
the parties (called “cross-transaction payment netting”).  This 
reduces transaction costs since numerous swap payments are 
incorporated into a single payment.40
Adding to the payment netting regime, the ISDA Master Agreement 
also provides for “close-out netting” that applies when one party to a 
transaction defaults or declares bankruptcy.41  Close-out netting allows 
the non-defaulting party to “calculate a single settlement amount by 
offsetting its scheduled future payment and delivery obligations to the 
bankrupt party against the bankrupt party’s obligations to it.”42  The 
practical benefit of a close-out netting arrangement is that it precludes a 
trustee or liquidator in bankruptcy from “cherry picking”—i.e., 
repudiating all trades that are out of the money for the bankrupt estate 
while insisting on performance of all trades that accrue to the estate’s 
benefit.43
DEFINITIONS 1, Exhibit A, at 61 (2003) [hereinafter ISDA CREDIT DEFINITIONS]; see 
also Flanagan, supra note 32, at 230. 
 38. ISDA CREDIT DEFINITIONS, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 61-70.  Like similar 
confirmations in other derivatives transactions, CDS confirmations provide that: “This 
Confirmation supplements, forms part of, and is subject to, the ISDA Master Agreement 
. . . between you and us.  All provisions contained in the Agreement govern this 
Confirmation except as expressly modified below.” Id. at 61.   
 39. ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 35, § 1(c), at 1 (“All Transactions are 
entered into in reliance on the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations 
form a single agreement between the parties . . . and the parties would not otherwise 
enter into any Transactions.”). 
 40. Flanagan, supra note 32, at 230-31. 
 41. See ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 35, at 11-15. 
 42. Flanagan, supra note 32, at 231. 
 43. S. Rory Derham, Set-off and Netting of Foreign Exchange Contracts in the 
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To the extent that CDS trades are documented under ISDA Master 
Agreements, the single-agreement, cross-payment netting, and close-out 
netting structures apply across CDS markets.  The usefulness of such 
arrangements becomes clear when one considers the fallout of Barings, 
Drexel-Burnham, or Enron-like bankruptcies, where the bankrupt party 
potentially has long and short positions in dozens of CDS transactions 
with multiple counterparties.  Without a master agreement, each trade 
would have to be individually reckoned with the risk, which a trustee 
would be able to repudiate trades that did not accrue to the bankrupt’s 
benefit.  With a master agreement in place, all CDS trades executed with 
each party under a Master Agreement can be assessed as a net amount 
under the established close-out netting mechanism. 
ISDA performs another vital function for CDS—and other 
derivatives—markets through its publication of protocols.44  ISDA 
protocols are ISDA-written contract amendments that allow all Master 
Agreement adherents to respond in a unified way to market 
disturbances.  For CDS markets, ISDA’s CDS Index Protocols are 
particularly important.  In normal circumstances, when a protection 
buyer and protection seller trade CDS on a company that is listed on a 
credit derivatives index, the index provides a price-discovery function 
that allows the parties to determine what spread is appropriate and how 
to settle their trade.  However, the bankruptcy filing of an index-listed 
company throws trading into chaos.  In response, an ISDA CDS Index 
Protocol “gives market participants a way to settle trades based on such 
indexes, by amending the documentation for such trades from physical 
to cash settlement and participating in an auction to determine the final 
price for . . . bonds” of the bankrupt company.45  All affected parties 
who send ISDA an adherence letter can take advantage of the unified 
response, giving all adhering parties equal footing in dealing with the 
bankrupt reference entity. 
Liquidation of a Counterparty: Part 2, Netting, 1991 J. BUS. L. 536, 537 (1991). 
 44. See http://www.isda.org/protocol/prot_nav.html (last visited May 9, 2006). 
 45. Christopher Faille, ISDA Publishes Protocol for Dana, HEDGEWORLD DAILY 
NEWS, Mar. 16, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 4426607; see also INT’L SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2006 DANA CDS INDEX PROTOCOL (2006). 
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III. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND INSURANCE REGULATION 
A. Credit Default Swaps and New York Insurance Regulation 
From their inception, CDS have provoked observers to ask whether 
they should be classified as insurance.  Their general form and function 
reflect many basic insurance arrangements.46  The New Oxford 
American Dictionary defines insurance as “a practice or arrangement by 
which a company . . . provides a guarantee of compensation for 
specified loss . . . in return for payment of a premium” and, even more 
simply, as “a thing providing protection against a possible 
eventuality.”47  Under both of these matching definitions, CDS look and 
feel like textbook insurance contracts.  Since insurance is an area of state 
regulation, one must look to state statutes to determine whether or not 
CDS receive insurance classification. 
Until a short time ago it was unclear that CDS were not insurance 
contracts under New York law, which provides that: 
‘Insurance contract’ means any agreement or other transaction 
whereby one party, the ‘insurer,’ is obligated to confer benefit of 
pecuniary value upon another party, the ‘insured’ or ‘beneficiary,’ 
dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous event in which the 
insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the time of such 
happening, a material interest which will be adversely affected by 
the happening of such event.48
Providing further guidance, New York law defines “fortuitous 
event” as “any occurrence or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by 
the parties to be, to a substantial extent beyond the control of either 
party.”49  Viewed on their face, these statutes define insurance contracts 
such that CDS—at least those with exogenous credit events—could be 
subject to insurance regulation, possibly making protection sellers 
civilly and even criminally liable for “doing an insurance business” 
without the proper license.50
 
 46. See, e.g., BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 68 (observing that “a credit default swap 
shares many similarities with traditional insurance products”). 
 47. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d ed., 2005). 
 48. N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(1) (2000); cf. id. § 107(a)(27). 
 49. Id. § 1101(a)(2). 
 50. See, e.g., id. § 1101(b); Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 8–10.  
Commenting on legal liability for selling insurance without a license, Nirenberg and 
Hoffman explain: 
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Concerned legal practitioners reacted to such provisions by 
stressing that the objectives of, and parties involved in, CDS transactions 
should preclude them from being regulated as insurance.51  New York 
practitioners David Nirenberg and Richard Hoffman applied this line of 
reasoning in a 2001 Derivatives Report article, and argued that the state 
regulates insurance to preserve its “natural interest in the safety and 
health of its inhabitants.”52  This organic instinct does not apply to CDS 
markets and their refined practitioners.  The state and its citizens do not 
care when a credit event occurs in relation to a basket of securities or a 
reference obligor.53  Confirming this point, the authors relate that “88% 
of the protection buyers and 86% of protection sellers . . . [a]re banks, 
securities firms, and insurance companies—hardly a group requiring 
protection.  In fact, virtually 100% of both the protection buyers and 
sellers are institutional investors, with the public having no exposure, or 
virtually none, to these contracts.”54  Extending this line of reasoning, 
Nirenberg and Hoffman point out that neither the SEC nor CFTC—
which have established exceptions for experienced buyers—apply the 
workings of securities and commodities laws to CDS markets.55
Beyond the sophistication of parties who trade CDS, fundamental 
objectives of many CDS transactions set them apart from garden-variety 
insurance contracts.  The ability in CDS, to both separate actual loss 
from amount recovered and dissociate reference entities from sources of 
credit exposure, reveals a very different game from the insurance world, 
where one is expected to receive compensation in direct proportion to 
demonstrable loss that is tied to an “insurable interest.”56  Concluding, 
Nirenberg and Hoffman underscore that these added features, when 
given prominent place in CDS agreements, allow hedging activities that 
For example, New York insurance law provides that any violation of the insurance 
code would be a misdemeanor and subject the violator to a fine of $1,000 for the first 
violation and $2,500 for each subsequent violation.  The state of Delaware could even 
require a Delaware corporation to forfeit its charter if it is found to be conducting an 
insurance business without a license.  Thus, if credit default swaps are deemed 
insurance by an insurance regulator, a protection seller could be subject to criminal 
prosecution, substantial fines, and forfeiture of its corporate charter unless it 
maintained the requisite licenses. 
Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 8. 
 51. Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 15. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 16. 
 56. Id. at 13-14. 
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give flexibility beyond mere loss compensation and—hopefully—
forestall efforts to label CDS as a form of insurance.57
In late 2004, an amendment to New York’s insurance laws 
permanently quelled the worries of those who feared insurance treatment 
for CDS.  In an addition to Article 69 on financial guarantee insurance 
corporations, the New York Senate and Assembly defined CDS as: 
An agreement referencing the credit derivative definitions published 
from time to time by the International Swap and Derivatives 
Association, Inc. or otherwise acceptable to the superintendent, 
pursuant to which a party agrees to compensate another party in the 
event of a payment default by, insolvency of, or other adverse credit 
event in respect of, an issuer of a specified security or other 
obligation; provided that such agreement does not constitute an 
insurance contract and the making of such credit default swap does 
not constitute the doing of an insurance business.58
Sidestepping the issue of how or why CDS differ from insurance 
contracts, the statute simply makes clear that the two are not 
synonymous; indeed, to be classified as insurance contracts is to lose 
status as CDS.  And so one is left to ask whether CDS and insurance are 
independent merely as a per se rule under New York law or whether 
there exists a fundamental difference between the two instruments. 
B. Introduction to the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners’ Draft White Paper and Its Relation to Credit Default 
Swaps 
Although New York has distinguished CDS from insurance, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issued a 
Draft White Paper in 2003 that—despite being aimed at weather 
derivatives—has important consequences for the question of whether 
state regulators might be willing to view CDS as insurance.59  The 
NAIC’s approach merits attention because, as a body composed of all of 
the state’s insurance commissioners that has met regularly for over 130 
 
 57. Id. at 16. 
 58. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j-1) (2005) (italics added); 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 
605 (S. 6679-A) (approved and effective Oct. 19, 2004). 
 59. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Comm., Weather Financial Instruments (Temperature): 
Insurance or Capital Markets Products? (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs Draft White 
Paper, Sept. 2, 2003), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ 
papers_weather_insurance.pdf (hereinafter Draft White Paper). 
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years, its suggestions often find its way into state law.60
The Draft White Paper addresses the nascent weather derivatives 
market, which the NAIC concludes should be regulated as insurance.61  
In support of this conclusion the NAIC forwards two main rationales.  
Its first rationale focuses on the fact that the purpose of weather 
derivatives, like weather insurance contracts, is risk transfer from one 
entity to another for a fee.  It all started innocently enough, energy 
providers trying to hedge the risk of low demand for natural gas and 
heating oil in mild weather and the high cost of buying such products in 
the open market when demand outstripped supply in extremely cold 
weather.62  But according to the NAIC, energy providers quickly began 
entering into weather-related energy “trades” on products unrelated to 
their core interests.63  Insurance and reinsurance companies then entered 
the fray, participating in trades with the energy providers who became 
“professional acceptors of risk transfers from other entities.”64  NAIC 
explains that “[g]enerally, businesses that are involved in accepting risk 
transfers for a fee are known as insurers and the fee paid by the entity 
seeking to transfer its risk is known as premium.”65
Placing this formulation of the NAIC’s chief rationale in a means-
versus-ends context,  the NAIC is essentially saying that the means 
utilized for obtaining risk transfer do not matter.  If your end-goal is to 
transfer and distribute risk for a fee, you are trading insurance products.  
A salient comparison in this regard might be to sham transactions in the 
tax context—a sham being any transaction that has no legitimate 
business purpose other than to avoid taxation.66  In like manner, the 
 60. See, e.g., Eric C. Nordman, The Early History of the NAIC, 19 J. INS. REG. 
164 (2000) (discussing the origins of the NAIC in May 1871); A Special Issue at the 
Dawn of the New Millennium of Insurance Regulation, Editor’s Perspective, 19 J. INS. 
REG. 159, 161 (2000) (stating that, “[t]he NAIC has become a de facto central 
authority”). 
 61. See supra note 59, at 2, 8.  Weather derivatives, like CDS, emerged as major 
capital markets products in the mid-1990s.  Although the Draft White Paper does not 
draw such a distinction it is clear that the NAIC is addressing OTC weather and energy 
derivatives and not exchange-traded derivatives. 
 62. Id. at 6. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).  Gregory v. Helvering is 
a classic “sham” case in which taxpayer intended to effect a distribution of shares and 
simultaneously avoid double taxation of the distribution.  To accomplish this end, the 
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NAIC seems to argue that the transaction documents involved in 
weather derivatives are merely a charade aimed at escaping regulation 
under state insurance regimes.  Driving its point home, the NAIC gives 
the following table comparing weather insurance and weather 
derivatives. 
 
NAIC COMPARISON OF WEATHER INSURANCE AND WEATHER 
DERIVATIVES 
 
SUBJECT WEATHER INSURANCE 
PRODUCTS 
WEATHER DERIVATIVES 
Who is covered? Named Insured Transaction Purchaser 
When does coverage 
apply? 
Policy Period Protection Period (also 
called an Effective Date 
and Termination Date) 
What is the maximum 
amount that will be paid?   
Coverage Limits Limit of Payout 
What is the event that 
causes a loss?   
Weather Peril Insured 
Against (Temperature, 
Rain or Snow) 
Weather Peril of Rain, 
Snow or Temperature 
How much does it cost? Premium Premium or fees 
What is the neutral 
source of trigger of 
coverage? 
Agreed upon U.S. 
Weather Reporting 
Station 
Agreed upon U.S. 
Weather Reporting 
Station 
What is the threshold for 
determining that a loss 
has occurred?   
Trigger of Coverage or 
Claim 
Strike Amount or 
Attachment 
What document is 
provided to the 
purchaser? 
Insurance Policy Transaction 
Settlement Provisions Valued at Value at Risk 
 
In establishing its second rationale, the NAIC reports that “these 
energy traders might have artificially inflated the indexes used to 
establish the price of natural gas.”67  Offering no explanation of how the 
profit motive of energy traders is linked to high natural gas prices or 
theory of how traders could use weather derivatives to fix such prices, 
 
taxpayer structured her deal as a corporate reorganization.  Commenting on taxpayer’s 
strategy, the Supreme Court said: “No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created.  
But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end [of tax avoidance].  
It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended from 
the beginning it should perform, no other function.”  Helvering, 293 U.S. at 469. 
 67. Id. at 8. 
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the NAIC quickly concludes that if weather and energy derivatives were 
“monitored as insurance products, it is likely that the regulatory scrutiny 
involved would help minimize the likelihood that the price manipulation 
would occur.”68  The NAIC stresses that not only would manipulation be 
reduced, but state regulators could then review such contracts for “fair 
treatment,” lack of “excessive” or “unfairly discriminatory” rates, and 
solvency of the counterparties.  Even if one conceded that weather 
derivatives bore some relation to price manipulation and that state 
insurance regulators could combat price fixing, the NAIC’s ad hoc 
reasoning does not explain why energy traders—and, a fortiori, 
insurance or reinsurance companies—lack powers of bargaining, 
analysis, and negotiation to such an extent that state regulators would 
have to ensure fair treatment. 
Six months after the NAIC released its Draft White Paper, ISDA 
and The Bond Market Association issued separate responses, both of 
which discredited the NAIC’s approach in the Draft White Paper and 
urged its rejection.69  Fundamentally, ISDA argues that weather 
derivatives are not insurance because they do not comport with the 
“insurable interest” and “loss indemnification” elements inherent in all 
insurance contracts.  Moreover, instead of simply spreading risk among 
a population of insurance policy holders, weather derivatives “reduce 
risk through trading—matching counterparties with complementary and 
offsetting risk profiles.”70  Last, ISDA argues that the weather 
derivatives market has been tinged by no scandal worthy of regulation 
(despite the vague NAIC argument to the contrary).  The Bond Market 
Association echoed ISDA’s sentiments,71 and both organizations 
echoed, to some extent, the approach advocated by the Office of General 
Counsel of the New York Insurance department: 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, ISDA, to Ernst N. 
Csiszar, President, NAIC and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance 
Markets, NAIC (Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://www.isda.org [hereinafter ISDA 
Letter to NAIC]; Letter from Michele C. David, Vice President and Asst. General 
Counsel, The Bond Market Ass’n, to Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance 
Markets, NAIC, and Ernst N. Csiszar, President, NAIC (Mar. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.bondmarkets.com/regulatory/comment_letter_to_naic_on_risked-linked.pdf 
(hereinafter Bond Market Ass’n Letter to NAIC). 
 70. ISDA Letter to NAIC, supra note 69, at 7. 
 71. Bond Market Ass’n Letter to NAIC, supra note 69, at 1-2. 
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Weather derivatives do not constitute insurance contracts under 
Section 1101(a) of the New York Insurance Law because the terms 
of the instrument do not provide that, in addition to or as part of the 
triggering event, payment to the purchaser is dependent upon that 
party suffering a loss.  Under such instruments, the issuer is 
obligated to pay the purchaser whether or not that purchaser suffers a 
loss.  Neither the amount of the payment nor the trigger itself in the 
weather derivative bears a relationship to the purchaser’s loss.  
Absent such obligations, the instrument is not an insurance 
contract.72
As noted, the debate surrounding the NAIC Draft White Paper is 
limited explicitly to weather and energy derivatives.  How do CDS fit 
into this debate?  In its response to the Draft White Paper, ISDA 
additionally cautions that the NAIC, in demolishing customary notions 
of insurance, gives “no replacement criteria to distinguish insurance 
from the many other varieties of risk management contracts.  The Draft 
White Paper’s logic could extend to a broad array of derivatives and 
would create substantial and disruptive regulatory uncertainty.”73  
ISDA’s concern applies more urgently in CDS than most derivative 
contexts. 
Both of the NAIC’s arguments in favor of making insurance 
regulation apply to weather derivatives pertain to CDS with equal force.  
Looking at the first NAIC rationale, credit protection sellers are 
“involved in accepting risk transfers for a fee,”74 which makes them 
insurers.  The spread paid by protection buyers is nothing more than an 
insurance premium.  Abstracting away from the second NAIC rationale, 
the mere “likelihood” of some catastrophe caused by derivatives posing 
as insurance is reason enough to step in and regulate so that the 
“insuring public [will not miss out] on many . . . market regulatory 
benefits that state insurance regulation provides.”75  The doomsayers 
among CDS market observers predicted that “derivatives tsunamis” and 
credit-market “blowups” could give NAIC-minded regulators ample 
reasons to step in and govern.76
 72. 2000 Inf. OGC Op. N.Y. Dept. Ins. 26, available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us 
/rg000205.htm. 
 73. Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, to Ernst N. 
Csiszar, President of NAIC, and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance 
Markets, NAIC, supra note 69, at 2. 
 74. Draft White Paper, supra note 59, at 6. 
 75. Id. at 8. 
 76. See, e.g., Der Hovanesian et al., supra note 6. 
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 Thus, NAIC reasoning leads to the conclusion that CDS must be 
regulated as insurance.  By contrast, opponents of such reasoning, which 
includes ISDA and NY, insist that CDS and other derivatives possess 
both formal and substantive characteristics that should prevent them 
from being regulated as insurance.  Is the dispute simply a spitting 
match, or does one side have the better argument? 
C. Robust Theory of Credit Default Swaps as Capital Markets Products 
 Despite the similarities between CDS and insurance contracts, it 
is clear that there are significant differences between the two.  NAIC-
minded regulators argue that the differences are merely cosmetic and 
that the ISDA system of documentation merely embellishes classic fee-
based risk distribution, which is the foundation of every insurance 
contract.  The following analysis will address such arguments on two 
levels.  First, the argument that CDS are essentially the same as 
insurance contracts will be assessed at the contract level, and the 
divergences between the two will be noted, catalogued, and integrated to 
illustrate how CDS differ from insurance contracts.  Second, the notion 
that CDS should be subject to insurance regulation will be evaluated at a 
market level.  Although CDS work to spread risks among participants, 
the mechanism and the purpose of its risk distribution are different from 
their counterparts in insurance markets.  These differences will be taken 
and combined to state how CDS markets differ from insurance markets. 
1. Credit Default Swaps as Capital Market Products: Contract Analysis 
In order to identify some bright-line rules that separate insurance 
and CDS, commentators quickly point to the insurance law principles of 
indemnity and insurable interest.77  Although these two concepts 
substantially explain how CDS differ from insurance instruments, they 
do not fully account for all of the differences that set the two regimes 
apart.  To apply these principles and put them in their proper setting, it 
will help to start with a fundamental observation and then to allow 
questions that guide analysis.  At bottom, both insurance products and 
CDS are arrangements based on contracts.  Working from this kernel of 
similarity, six questions will develop the present analysis into an 
 
 77. See, e.g., Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 13-15; Letter from Robert 
G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, to Ernst N. Csiszar, President of NAIC, and 
Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance Markets, NAIC, supra note 69, at 2-6. 
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explanatory theory: (a) Who can enter into the contract? (b) To what 
property can the contract extend coverage? (c) To what extent can the 
purchaser transfer the contract? (d) What events and subsequent action 
warrant a claim under the contract? (e) How does the contract measure 
recovery? (f) How do the parties settle a contract? 
The evaluation that follows will treat each of these questions in 
turn, comparing and contrasting the results that each yields when applied 
to insurance and CDS regimes. 
a. Who Can Enter Into the Contract? 
Any person who has a legitimate economic interest in preserving 
property from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage can enter into an 
insurance contract.78  To have such an interest is, in fact, to have an 
“insurable interest.”79  Failure of this interest will almost certainly mean 
either that an insurance contract never existed in the first place or that 
recovery will be denied.80
By contrast, the only prerequisite to entering into CDS is that the 
participants be “eligible” parties under the appropriate federal acts (a 
hurdle aimed at keeping inexperienced and undercapitalized parties 
away from trading).81  Assuming that CDS participants are major 
financial institutions, which is persistently the case, they do not need to 
hold any interest in preserving property from loss.82  A protection buyer 
might have an interest in protecting a loan portfolio from loss; it could, 
however, simply feel exposed to a given market due to various factors 
and wish to buy protection despite not owning any insurable asset.  
Either way, CDS can be used to hedge risk. 
 78. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to 
Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines and Commercial Practices § 3.4(a)(1)-(5), at 
164-72 (practitioner’s ed. 1988); id. § 3.3(b)(2), at 153.  The use of “legitimate” in this 
context means “legal” or “lawful.”  The authors comment that a lawful interest “is not, 
for example, an interest that exists only because of an expectation of profit from illegal 
activity (such as an interest in contraband liquor).” Id. § 3.4(a)(5), at 169. 
 79. Id. § 3.4(a)(1), at 164-65. 
 80. See id.; Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and 
Public Policy 35 (Yale University Press 1986). 
 81. See, e.g., Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)(12), 2(d). 
 82. See, e.g., Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 13-14. 
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b. To What Property Can The Contract Extend? 
 Insurance contracts cover only risk of loss arising out of property 
in which the insured has an insurable interest.83  In other words, insurers 
cover property that the insured has incentive to protect from loss and 
damage.  Insurance authorities Robert Keeton and Kenneth Abraham 
both explain that this requirement works at the contract level to mitigate 
moral hazard, which accompanies insurance contracts because “insureds 
sometimes have more information about their expected loss than 
insurers.  Certainly because insureds can control their own behavior, 
they have it within their power to act inconsistently with insurer’s 
interests by taking less care that they would were they not insured.”84  
By requiring the insured’s vested economic interest in covered property, 
insurers can be more certain that loss will be caused by statistically 
predictable exogenous events rather than events within the insured’s 
control. 
 Since they do not have an “insurable interest” aspect, CDS allow 
protection buyers to hedge exposure to credit risk regardless of its 
source, even permitting speculative use unrelated to any actual risk.85  
The 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and Confirmation do not 
require contracting parties to designate property in which protection 
buyers have an insurable interest; instead, the confirmation directs 
parties to designate a “reference entity.”86  The reference entity can be 
any corporation, index, fund or other benchmark that the parties 
designate.  This allows the parties to dissociate the reference entity from 
the protection buyer’s source of actual credit exposure (an ability that 
would vitiate an insurance contract). 
Information asymmetries occur in both insurance contracts and 
CDS, albeit causing a different effect.  Just as the insurer knows that its 
 83. See, e.g., Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.4(a)(1)-(5), at 164-72. 
 84. Abraham, supra note 80, at 35; see Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, 
§ 6.6(e)(3), at 700-01; see also id. § 3.1(c), at 136-39. 
 85. In its 2005 CDS report, FitchRatings reveals that “[r]espondents identified the 
following three factors as the principal driving forces for using CDS: trading, credit risk 
portfolio management, and alternative investment class.” FitchRatings Report 2005, 
supra note 3, at 7.  In contrast, the authors note that speculation and wagering were 
absolutely inimical to the historical purposes of insurance law.  See Keeton & Widiss, 
supra note 78, § 3.1(c), at 136-39.  This sets insurance contracts even further apart from 
CDS as instruments for distributing risk. 
 86. ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, § 2.1, § 2.3, at 6, 9, Exhibit A, at 61-
62. 
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insured has superior knowledge as to potential loss, protection sellers 
likewise worry about the possibility that the protection buyer has better 
information on the credit risk involved in the trade.  But insurers and 
protection sellers worry about these asymmetries for different reasons.  
The insurer’s information asymmetry is problematic because of its 
relation to moral hazard (to the likelihood that the insured will fail to 
exercise due care), thus causing a higher chance that the insurer will be 
required to make payment.  A credit protection seller is not worried 
about moral hazard.  It is worried that that potential information 
asymmetry will result in an inaccurate spread, which could spoil either 
the risk neutrality of the hedge that has been put in place or the expected 
return from CDS used as investments. 
c. To What Extent Can the Purchaser Transfer the Contract? 
In addition to the “insurable interest doctrine,” another key 
insurance law axiom dictates that “insurance is a personal contract.”87  
Explaining this doctrine, one state supreme court explained that “the 
identity of the insured is a matter of importance to the insurance 
company.”88  Insurance companies use information on the identities of 
those whom they insure to effectively assess and distribute risk.  If the 
identity of the insured changes, the risk profile of the insurance contract 
also changes.  As a result, the doctrine of “insurance as personal 
contract” and its effects generally work to restrict the ability of insureds 
to transfer their interest in an insurance contract.89  Although the 
insured’s interests under a contract can be transferred, this typically 
requires securing the approval of the insurer and, depending on the type 
of insurance transaction, occurs rarely.90
To illustrate this point, one can imagine two neighbors, each of 
whom drives a BMW 525 sedan made in 2006 with standard 
specifications.  Neighbor A is twenty-one years old.  He received the 
BMW from his father as a birthday present and has received two 
speeding tickets in the last six months.  He attends a local community 
college and receives barely adequate grades.  Neighbor B is fifty years 
old.  He has worked at the same accounting firm for the last twenty-five 
 87. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.1(d)(2), at 140. 
 88. Id. at 140 n.5 (citing McHugh v. Manhattan Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 109 
N.W.2d 842, 844 (1961)). 
 89. Id. § 4.2(e), at 316. 
 90. Id. 
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years and has never received a speeding ticket.  If B decided that he was 
done driving and wanted to transfer his insurance policy to A, one 
imagines that the insurer would not allow the transfer (and if it did, A 
would certainly not pay the same premium that B paid). 
In CDS, the protection seller is less concerned with the identity of 
the protection buyer than it is with the spread that the protection buyer 
pays.  This is not to say that the protection seller is completely 
indifferent to its counterparty risk; it is instead to underscore the fact that 
the accuracy of the CDS spread, as opposed to the counterparty’s 
identity, will be the metric that determines how well the CDS works to 
diffuse credit risk.  Moreover, since information on the top reference 
entities is so plentiful, accurate CDS spreads give great liquidity to the 
CDS market and facilitate easy trading.91  To transfer interests under a 
CDS agreement or portfolio to another party, the parties enter into a 
novation transaction, which is documented in its own confirmation.92
The difference between CDS contract transferability and insurance 
policy transferability underscores another vital difference between the 
two systems: the relative bargaining power of the parties.  Insurers, to a 
large extent, are able to dictate the terms of insurance policies to their 
purchasing counterparties.93  The bargaining relationship between 
insurer and insured is asymmetrically skewed toward the insurer.  In 
CDS, the protection buyer and protection seller co-negotiate the 
agreement that eventually gets memorialized in a Confirmation.  Unlike 
an insurance contract, the buyer is just as likely and able to transfer its 
interest in a CDS contract as a seller—bilateral novation is the only 
hurdle.  In CDS trades, the relationship between protection buyer and 
protection seller is symmetrical. 
d. What Events and Subsequent Action Warrant a Claim Under the 
Contract? 
Once a purchaser has entered into either an insurance contract or a 
 91. See, e.g., Hull, supra note 5, at 510 (commenting that “[i]n addition to 
monitoring credit spreads, indices provide a way market participants can easily buy or 
sell a portfolio of credit default swaps”). 
 92. ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit F, at 77.  In general, transfer 
of interests in an OTC derivatives transaction is governed by Section 7 of the ISDA 
Master Agreement, which can be instantiated by the CDS Novation Confirmation.  See 
ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 35, § 7, at 15. 
 93. See Abraham, supra note 80, at 32-34. 
2007] RISK DISTRIBUTION IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 193 
 
CDS, it performs under the contract by paying periodic premiums until 
events occur that trigger obligations on the part of the insurer or 
protection seller.  In an insurance contract, a loss- or damage-causing 
insured event will trigger the insured’s duty to inform insurer of the loss 
or damage.94  Analogously, in the Confirmation filled out pursuant to a 
CDS trade, the buyer and seller designate which “credit events” will 
apply to their trade.95  A credit event can be the reference entity’s 
bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default, obligation acceleration, 
restructuring, or other event.96  Unlike the loss required in the insurance 
context, a credit event does not have to affect the protection buyer 
directly or cause damage (although it could). 
When an insured suffers a loss, the loss triggers a number of 
documents that flow between the insured and the insurer.  The insured 
must promptly submit both a “notice of loss,” and “proof of loss.”97  
Failure to submit either document can result in denial of coverage.98  In 
response to the insured’s filings, the insurer gives the insured “all 
documents which the insured receives in the event a suit is filed against 
the insured.”99
In CDS transactions, where the provable loss requirement does not 
exist, a successful claim on occurrence of a credit event requires only 
one document: a Credit Event Notice.100  The Credit Event Notice, 
making reference to publicly available information that is laid out in a 
prior confirmation, simply states that “a Credit Event occurred with 
respect to the Reference Entity” and gives a brief description of the 
event.101  In response to the Credit Event Notice, the protection buyer 
and seller perform under the terms of the CDS confirmation. 
e. How Does the Contract Measure Recovery? 
When an insured suffers a protected loss under an insurance policy, 
her recovery can be measured in one of three ways.  Typically, insurers 
cover property to the extent of its “actual cash value,” which is usually 
 94. See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 7.2(a), (c), at 749, 58-59. 
 95. ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 64. 
 96. Id. at 64-65. 
 97. Id. at 749, 58-59. 
 98. Id. § 7.2(c), at 759. 
 99. Id. § 7.2(a), at 749. 
 100. See ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit B, at 71. 
 101. Id. 
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measured against its fair market value.102  Where objects do not have a 
fair market value that can be readily ascertained, insurance policies 
measure recovery either by its replacement value or by the original price 
paid for it by the insured.103  Regardless of whether recovery is 
measured in terms of actual cash value, replacement value, or original 
price paid, the principle of indemnity caps recovery in order to prevent 
net gain to the insured.104  Indeed, the entire insurance system is based 
on the notion that “the amount of insurance benefits paid when a loss is 
sustained by an insured is not to exceed the economic measure of the 
loss.”105  In other words, without demonstrable loss there can be no 
recovery under a contract by any measure and the amount recovered can 
never exceed the loss. 
The framework for CDS transactions and the ISDA documentation 
that accompanies it does not measure recovery against actual loss.  
Instead, ISDA and CDS documents define recovery in terms of a 
reference entity, settlement terms, settlement method, valuation metrics, 
and deliverable obligations negotiated by the protection buyer and seller 
as expressed in a confirmation.106  Under this mechanism, the amount 
that a protection seller pays out upon a credit event may bear little or no 
relation to the protection buyer’s loss (assuming that the buyer even 
sustained a loss).107  Thus, the measure of recovery under CDS does not 
preserve the principle of indemnity. 
f. How Do the Parties Settle a Contract? 
Although the tort litigation process in some insurance cases can 
adjust the exact route of payment from an insurer to its insured, the 
general rule is that insurer pays the insured a cash sum for its loss 
according the measure of loss prescribed in the insurance policy.  In 
CDS, the parties can designate either cash settlement or physical 
settlement.  Explaining the cheapest-to-deliver bond rule in the context 
of CDS physical settlement, David Nirenberg comments: 
 
 102. See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.9(a), at 208. 
 103. Id. at 209. 
 104. Id. § 3.6(a), at 191-92. 
 105. Id. § 3.1(a), at 135. 
 106. See ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 62-69. 
 107. See Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 14. 
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In some credit default swaps, the protection buyer can deliver any 
obligation of a reference entity rather than the reference obligation.  
This would be like insuring a late-model luxury vehicle and, on an 
insurable event in which the vehicle is significantly damaged, the 
insured gets to keep the damaged luxury vehicle and delivers an old 
rusted-out, high-mileage, low-end model of the same manufacturer 
to the insurer while the company delivers the luxury vehicle’s 
replacement value.  This does not comport with traditional concepts 
of insurance.108
 Thus, the process of physical settlement—especially where a 
cheapest-to-deliver rule applies—radically differentiates CDS settlement 
from insurance settlement.  But what about cash settlement under CDS?  
When CDS counterparties opt for cash settlement, they designate a 
“calculation agent” in their confirmation.109  As the amount due under a 
cash-settled arrangement comes due, the calculation agent’s task is to 
“poll market participants to determine the value of the defaulted assets, 
and the protection seller is liable for the difference between face and 
recovery values.”110  Whereas the claims assessor under an insurance 
contract is an agent of the insurer, the calculation agent is a designee of 
both parties, which underscores the symmetrical relationship between 
the protection buyer and the protection seller. 
 While the possibility of physical settlement and a dual-appointed 
calculation agent distinguish the CDS settlement process, the starkest 
differences between insurance and CDS settlement processes arise in 
consideration of the ISDA Master Agreement’s “one agreement,” 
“cross-payment netting,” and “close-out netting” provisions.111  Since 
insurance is inherently a “personal contract,” it is often overlooked but 
nonetheless vital that each contract is separate and requires separate 
settlement.  Not so for CDS.  Where two parties execute a string of 
separate CDS under an ISDA Master Agreement, each with its own 
confirmation, then all of the trades “form a single agreement between 
the parties . . . and the parties would not otherwise enter into any 
[t]ransactions.”112  As a result of this contractual device, the parties can 
elect to apply cross-payment netting to their CDS.  To illustrate this, one 
can imagine two banks that have entered into dozens of CDS with one 
 108. Id. 
 109. ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 62. 
 110. See Bomfin, supra note 25, at 69. 
 111. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 35, §§ 1(c), 2(c), 6, at 1, 2, 11-12. 
 112. Id. § 1(c), at 1. 
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another, each bank holding both long and short positions.  One bank 
wishes to transfer all of its trades to another counterparty and the other 
bank agrees to the novation transaction.  Instead of individually 
reckoning the balance on each trade, paying piecemeal, the banks can 
calculate the net amount owing under all trades and settle the accounts in 
one net payment. 
The one-agreement, cross-payment mechanism—perhaps more than 
any other aspect indigenous to CDS—represents how far the derivatives 
regime is from an insurance model.  Everything about insurance—
insurable interest, indemnification, personal contract—militates against 
the notion of a net amount that could be paid out on multiple contracts in 
absence of any demonstrable loss. 
2. Credit Default Swaps as Capital Markets Products: Market Analysis 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates elemental differences between 
CDS and insurance at the contract level.  As patterns emerge from the 
interplay between these contract-level distinctions, a broader perspective 
on the market differences between CDS and insurance emerges.  Two 
main differences come to the fore: (1) risk classes versus credit spread as 
the means of neutralizing risk and (2) (cross-buyer) liquidity. 
Hundreds of millions of “personal contracts” constitute the 
insurance world—contracts in which “the identity of the insured is a 
matter of importance to the insurance company.”113  The insured’s 
identity—and more specifically the property in which the insured has an 
interest subject to the insurer’s indemnity—matters so much because it 
is the best single indicator of the probability that the insurer will have to 
make payment under the insurance contract.  Responding to this reality, 
insurers specialize in categorizing and quantifying identity-related risks 
to maintain a profit-preserving ratio of policies to claims.  Commenting 
on insurers’ efforts to categorize, Kenneth Abraham explains that the 
most effective tool for minimizing the effects of moral hazard, 
preserving a steady return, and distributing risk: 
[I]s to create risk classes and to vary the prices charged for coverage, 
depending on the expected loss of each class of insureds.  The more 
accurate and detailed this risk classification, the greater its influence 
 
 113. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.1(d)(2), at 140 n.5 (citing McHugh v. 
Manhattan Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 363 Mich. 324, 328, 109 N.W.2d 842, 844 
(1961)). 
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on the allocation between loss prevention and insurance . . . . In 
constructing risk classes, the insurer’s goal is to determine the 
expected loss of each insured and to place insureds with expected 
similar losses into the same class, so that each may be charged the 
same rate.114
By creating classes of insureds that correspond to individual risk 
profiles, the insurance market is able to efficiently spread catastrophic 
risk across the full spectrum of policyholders.  In contrast, derivatives 
“reduce risk through trading—matching counterparties with 
complementary and offsetting risk profiles.”115  In the world of CDS, the 
one element that allows parties to trade and match offsetting risk profiles 
is the credit spread.  Whereas insurance companies group policyholders 
based on real-world, historical data, CDS credit spreads are calculated 
based on a risk-neutral model of evaluating the default probabilities of 
individual reference entities.116  This risk-neutral valuation model places 
CDS in the same company as options, forwards, and other derivatives 
that are clearly recognized as capital market products despite their added 
ability to spread and hedge risk. 
The other feature that strongly differentiates the CDS market from 
the market for insurance policies is the existence of credit indices.  In 
insurance markets, insurers have the ability to trade, transfer and 
securitize policies amongst themselves; policyholders, however (as their 
name would suggest), simply hold policies.  Policyholders generally 
cannot transfer their interests; to the extent that they can, they cannot do 
it in a way nor on a scale that would give rise to a market.  As a result, 
insurance markets (at least on the policyholder side) possess no 
instrument allowing for price discovery, which would increase liquidity. 
In CDS markets, the rise of Dow Jones CDX and iTraxx has created 
an enormous amount of liquidity.  As noted, market makers are able to 
quote long and short spreads for CDS at practically all times, allowing 
both protection buyers and protection sellers to constantly evaluate the 
value of their trades and transfer if desired.  This development, more 
than perhaps any other that has been mentioned, firmly marks CDS as 
capital markets products. 
 114. Abraham, supra note 80, at 15, 68. 
 115. Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, to Ernst N. 
Csiszar, President of NAIC, and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance 
Markets, NAIC, supra note 69, at 7. 
 116. See Hull, supra note 5, at 244-47, 468-89, 510-13. 
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One last brief observation on how CDS markets differ from 
insurance markets merits recognition.  In assessing CDS, state insurance 
regulators must keep in mind that CDS are not products which can be 
purchased by the general populace.  As already noted multiple times, the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 amended the 
Commodities Exchange Act to limit the field of prospective CDS 
buyers—only “eligible contract participants” need apply.  As long as 
CDS trades take place between eligible contract participants, Congress 
has generally prohibited the SEC and CFTC from regulating CDS.  
David Nirenberg and Richard Hoffman rightly conclude: “If Congress 
has determined that no regulation of these products is appropriate, it 
would seem inappropriate for a state to determine that there is a 
compelling state interest in regulating them to protect its citizens.”117
3. Credit Default Swaps as Capital Markets Products: A Theory 
And so it comes time to state a theory.  The table below 
summarizes and compares the contract and market differences between 
insurance and CDS. 
 
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND INSURANCE 
 
 
INQUIRY 
 
 
INSURANCE 
 
 
CDS 
 
WHO CAN ENTER INTO 
THE CONTRACT? 
Any person possessing an 
economic interest in 
preserving property from 
loss, destruction, or 
pecuniary damage 
Any bank, insurance 
company, corporation 
or other eligible party 
under the 
Commodities 
Exchange Act  
CONTRACTING 
PARTY MUST 
POSSESS 
INSURABLE 
INTEREST? 
Yes No  
ELIGIBILITY UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW? 
No Yes 
 
 117. Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 16. 
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INQUIRY 
 
 
INSURANCE 
 
 
CDS 
 
 
TO WHAT PROPERTY CAN 
THE CONTRACT EXTEND 
COVERAGE? 
Property that someone 
has incentive to protect 
from risk of loss, 
destruction, or pecuniary 
damage  
Reference entity 
 PROPERTY SUBJECT 
TO INSURABLE 
INTEREST? 
Yes No 
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN 
THE PURCHASER 
TRANSFER THE 
CONTRACT?   
Limited ability to 
transfer, subject to 
insurer’s approval 
Easily transferable 
upon novation by the 
parties 
  
PARTY SYMMETRY? 
No, asymmetrical 
relation between insured 
and insurer, skewed 
toward insurer 
Yes, symmetrical 
relation between 
protection buyer and 
protection seller 
WHAT EVENT INITIATES 
A CLAIM FOR RECOVERY 
UNDER THE CONTRACT? 
Event inflicting loss, 
destruction, or pecuniary 
damage on covered 
property 
Credit event as 
specified in ISDA 
confirmation 
 REQUIREMENT OF 
ACTUAL LOSS? 
Yes No 
ASSUMING OCCURRENCE 
OF A RECOVERY EVENT, 
WHAT DOCUMENTS MUST 
BE PRESENTED TO 
CLAIM? 
(1) Notice of loss 
(2) Proof of loss 
Credit Event Notice 
HOW DOES THE 
CONTRACT MEASURE 
RECOVERY? 
Actual cash value, 
original price paid, or 
replacement value 
In relation to reference 
entity, settlement 
terms, settlement 
method, valuation 
metrics, and 
deliverable obligations 
 RECOVERY CAPPED 
AT ACTUAL LOSS 
(PRINCIPLE OF 
INDEMNITY 
APPLIES)? 
Yes No 
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INQUIRY 
 
 
INSURANCE 
 
 
CDS 
 
HOW DO THE PARTIES 
SETTLE A CONTRACT? 
Cash settlement Cash settlement or 
physical settlement 
 POSSIBILITY OF 
PHYSICAL 
SETTLEMENT? 
No Yes 
 CHEAPEST-TO-
DELIVER OPTION? 
No Yes 
 MANY CONTRACTS, 
ONE AGREEMENT? 
No Yes 
 CROSS-PAYMENT 
AND CLOSE-OUT 
NETTING? 
No Yes 
WHAT MECHANISM IS 
USED TO VALUE RISK AT 
A MARKET LEVEL? 
 
Creation of risk classes 
and variation of the 
prices charged for 
coverage based on class 
Risk-neutral 
evaluation of 
reference entity 
default probabilities 
MARKET MAKERS AND 
INDICES THAT SERVE 
BOTH BUYERS AND 
SELLERS? 
No Yes 
 
In considering the weight of these various differences, stating a 
theory is straightforward.  In stating the theory’s propositions, the jargon 
of insurance law will be avoided to the extent possible.  The 
propositions below are disjunctive; failure under any of them means that 
the contract involved is not insurance.  Any CDS trade will fulfill at 
least one of the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: Where a party enters into a contract for contingent 
recovery possessing no economic interest in protecting the covered 
property from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance. 
 
Proposition 2: When the contract for recovery fails to reference 
property that the purchasing party has economic incentive to protect 
from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance. 
 
Proposition 3: When recovery under a contract can be had without 
substantiating any actual loss or damage, the contract is not insurance. 
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Proposition 4: Where a party can recover under a contract an 
amount that exceeds expenses caused by loss or damage, the contract is 
not insurance. 
 
Proposition 5: Where a contract for recovery allows physical 
settlement, the contract is not insurance. 
 
Proposition 6: Where a contract for recovery provides for cross-
payment netting under a master agreement, the contract is not insurance. 
IV. CONCLUSION: FEE-BASED RISK DISTRIBUTION IN THE CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
The capital markets always have been and always will be a vehicle 
for efficiently distributing risk.  Many financial instruments regulated 
under Federal securities and commodities laws allow their users to fulfill 
functions that resemble the general mechanism of an insurance contract.  
However, not every contract that allows for fee-based distribution of risk 
should also be subject to regulation under state insurance laws.  Weather 
derivatives represent one such instrument; CDS represent another.  
While insurance companies target individual consumers—meriting 
efforts by the state ensure fair conditions for consumers—CDS 
transactions take place exclusively between banks and other 
sophisticated parties.  In considering whether CDS should be regulated 
as insurance contracts under state law, state insurance regulators must 
recognize the insoluble differences between the two groups of 
instruments.  CDS are not insurance.
